Marital Privileges and the Right To Testify

In the twentieth century there has been an increasing recognition that
the married woman can be not only a partner in marriage, but also a
partner in crime. As a defendant, she of course has the universally
recognized right to testify in her own behalf.1 If, however, she has been
indicted with her husband on the same or similar criminal charges,
her right to testify in her own behalf may conflict with her husband's
privilege to exclude adverse spousal testimony or his privilege to exclude testimony which reveals the content of confidential communications he has made to her. Resolution of this conflict is particularly
important when the wife is charged with a conspiratorial or accessorial role, since little more than the natural inferences which arise
from the marital relationship-close association with her husband and
knowledge of his acts-may be sufficient to sustain a conviction; the
overt act of aid might easily be found in the everyday acts incident
to marriage. 2 This conflict could also arise when the husband seeks to
testify in his own behalf;3 the focus of this comment on the wife's
problem is solely for the sake of clarity. The purposes of this comment
are to explore the ways of resolving the conflict in those jurisdictions
in which such a conflict is possible and to suggest that granting separate
trials is the most satisfactory solution.
Most states have placed restrictions upon the ability of a wife to
offer testimony which is adverse to her husband. The most complete
1 2 WIGMom, EViDENCE § 579 (3d ed. 1940).
2 In recognizing this problem, Chief Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California has emphasized that: "[C]ourts still have the responsibility to guard against applying
the law of conspiracy to a wife solely on the ground that she has acted without compulsion. There may be situations where a wife is aware of her husband's illegal activity
and even passively helpful to him in the everyday acts incident to marriage. Nevertheless
she is not a conspirator unless her actions amount to active participation transcending
acts that 'would technically be sufficient to involve her in a criminal conspiracy with
him, but which might be far removed from the arm's-length agreement typical of that
crime.' " People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1964), quoting in
part from United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
3 See State v. Pickles, 46 N.J. 542, 218 A.2d 609 (1966), where the court held that it
was possible that the husband really did not know that his child had been burned or
that his wife had caused and later neglected the injuries; separate trials were ordered
to permit independent consideration of the husband's conduct.
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restriction today is the non-waivable rule that a wife is incompetent
to give such testimony. 4 This prohibition stems from the old common
law rule, in force at a time when a wife could not be convicted of a
crime except under special circumstances, that she was incompetent to
testify for or against her husband. In many jurisdictions, statutory
rules of incompetency have been weakened by decisions that unless
the husband makes a timely objection to the competency of his wife's
testimony, the prohibition is waived7 This waiver provision transforms
4 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1965), State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d
763 (1952); TEx. CODE CRrM. PRoc. art. 88.11 (1966), Brock v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 35,
71 S.W. 20 (1902), Hagans v. State, 372 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962) (dictum).
5 The wife could be convicted of a crime when she acted alone, or committed murder
or treason, or one of certain special offenses such as keeping a brothel. 4 BLACKSTONE,
COmMENTARES *28-29. The common law approach also made it impossible for the wife
to be charged with assisting or conspiring with her husband in criminal endeavors.
A number of jurisdictions still provide the married woman a measure of immunity
from criminal prosecution by maintaining a presumption of marital coercion-a wife
who commits a crime with her husband is presumed to be acting under his coercion. See
generally Perkins, The Doctrine of Marital Coercion, 29 TEMiP. L.Q. 190, 192 (1956).
However, in those states, many exceptions to the presumption, other than those crimes
which the common law excepted, have been introduced by statute. See, e.g., OXrA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 157 (1958). (e.g., maiming, seduction, child abuse, abortion, bigamy, obscene
exhibition of books). Some courts have held the presumption to be so weak as to be
rebuttable by slight proof. E.g., United States v. Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Pa.
1956) (dictum). Some state legislatures have abolished the presumption. E.g., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (1963); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1092. In other states the doctrine has been
abolished judicially. E.g., State v. Renslow, 211 Iowa 642, 230 N.W. 316 (1930); King v.
City of Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S.W. 297 (Ct. App. 1920). See generally Note, The
Effect of Marriage on the Rules of the Criminal Law, 61 COLtrM. L. Rxv. 73 (1961).
The impact of this evolution of the married woman's criminal responsibility is most
apparent in the area of criminal conspiracy. Although it had often been held under the
common law that a wife could be indicted with her husband for conspiracy when a
third person was involved, the theory of the unity of husband and wife usually prevented an indictment of the husband and wife alone. See, e.g., Gros v. United States,
138 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943); People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934 (1889); Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 Pa. County Ct. 65 (1900). Contra, Johnson v. United States, 157 F.2d
209 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920). Generally this
conspiracy doctrine persisted longer than the rule prohibiting criminal prosecution of
the wife, but in recent years it has been substantially eroded. See, e.g., United States v.
Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960), overruling Gros v. United States, supra; People v. Pierce, 61
Cal. 2d 879, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964), overruling People v. Miller, supra. But see State v.
Struck, 44 N.J. Super. 274, 129 S.2d 910 (Essex County Ct. 1957).
6 At common law, exceptions were made in cases of absolute necessity, as when a husband was accused of a crime against his wife's person. See, e.g., State v. Neill, 6 Ala. 685
(1844). The wife was competent to testify for her husband in certain other matters.
See, e.g., Littlefield v. Rice, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 287 (1845) (involving accuracy of account
books kept by wife under husband's direction); McGill v. Rowand, 3 Pa. 451 (1846)
(involving proof of the contents of a trunk, on the theory that a wife usually packs
for her husband).
7 See State v. Houston, 50 Iowa 512 (1879), interpreting IowA CODE ANN. § 622.7 (1950);
Huff v. State, 176 Miss. 443, 169 So. 839 (1936), interpreting Miss. CODE ANN. § 1689 (1942);
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the incompetency rule into the husband's more familiar privilege to
exclude his wife's adverse testimony.
There were several rationales for the old rule of incompetency.
Courts were reluctant to risk placing a wife in the position of having
to choose between her duty to testify truthfully and her duty to provide aid and comfort to her husband.8 There was also fear of producing
marital disharmony if the wife's testimony were unfavorable to her
husband. 9 Most often it was said that her testimony was likely to depend upon her feelings toward her spouse 0 or, more important, that
her own interests as a wife were too closely tied to those of her husband
to trust her testimony." In short, it was thought that her testimony was
so likely to be untrustworthy that as a general rule it ought not to be
admitted.
The contemporary justification for the privilege to exclude adverse
spousal testimony was stated by Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
2
Court in Hawkins v. United States:'

The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against
husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to
foster family peace, not only for the benefit of the husband,
wife, and children, but for the benefit of the public as well.
Such a belief has never been unreasonable and is not now. 13
It has been said by critics of the testimony privilege that it is nothing
more than an anachronism inhibiting full disclosure of all relevant
facts; 14 that if the wife is willing to volunteer testimony there may be
little harmony left to preserve. Mr. Justice Black gave this answer:
Ruch v. State, 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 67 (1924), interpreting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2954.42 (Baldwin 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Haines v. Banmiller, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d
219 (1959) aff'd, 898 Pa. 7, 157 A.2d 167 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 807 (1960), interpreting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1964); Bernell v. State, 74 Okla. Crim. 92, 101, 123 P.2d
289, 293 (1942) (dictum), interpreting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 702 (Supp. 1965).
8 Kelly v. Proctor, 41 N.H. 139 (1960).
9 Ibid.
10 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 601, at 732 (3d ed. 1940).
11 Id. at 731. See also Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), overruled,
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 387 (1933).
12 358 U.S. 74 (1958). This case upheld the privilege in the federal courts.
13 Id. at 77. For a general discussion of the marital privileges in the federal courts
see Orfield, The Husband-Wife Privileges in Federal Criminal Procedure, 24 Ormo ST. L.J.
144 (1963).
14 See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring);
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 23, comment; Committee on Improvements in the Law of
Evidence, Report, 63 REPORTS OF THE ABA 570, 594-95 (1938); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2228, at 221 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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But not all marital flare-ups in which one spouse wants to
hurt the other are permanent. The widespread success
achieved by the courts throughout the country conciliating
family differences is a real indication that some apparently
broken homes can be saved provided no unforgivable act is
done by either party. Adverse testimony given in criminal
proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any
marriage. 15
But if a wife has been indicted with her husband and is in danger of
losing her life or her freedom, then perhaps the danger of doing irreparable harm to the marriage by permitting her to testify loses its
importance by comparison. Furthermore, her husband's refusal to
permit her to exculpate herself is likely to be as destructive of the
marriage as anything she might say against him.
In a number of jurisdictions restrictions on adverse testimony have
been limited by allowing only the wife, as a witness, to invoke a privilege to refuse to render such testimony, 16 apparently on the theory
that the wife should be permitted to determine for herself whether her
marriage can or should be saved by her refusal to testify.'7 Several other
jurisdictions, apparently heeding the arguments of the critics of the
testimonial privilege, have completely abolished it.'8 In these, there
remain restrictions only on the wife's testimony concerning her husband's confidential communications. The most common of these is the
husband's privilege to exclude his wife's testimony as to the confidential communications made to her during their marriage. 19 As with the
15 Hawkins v. United States, 858 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958).
16 See ALA. CODE: tit. 15, § 311 (1958); CALiF. Evm. CODE § 970 (effective Jan. 1, 1967);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 306 (Supp. V 1966f);
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1604 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (1963); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:461 (1950; MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 20
(Supp. 1965).
17 See Note, 38 VA. L. Rrv. 359 (1952), favoring this rule.
18 See State v. Lynch, 32 Del. 600, 128 Atl. 565 (1925) (dictum), interpretingDEL. CODE
ANN. ch. 11, § 3502 (1953); Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909), and Porter v.
State, 160 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 US. 849 (1965), interpreting
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.04, 932.31; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1965); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-423 (1963), adopting UNIFORM RULE OF EVmENcE 23; ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1315 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 516, § 27 (1955); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2445; S.C. CODE
ANN. § 26-403 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1958).
19 See, e.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (Supp. 1966); CAL. EVm. CODE § 980 (effective
Jan. 1, 1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. 1947 § 9-203 (Supp. 1965); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:461
(1950); MxcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2162 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (1945); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 1689 (1942); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4 (1947); NEv. REV. STAT. § 48.040
(1957); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2445; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 684 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7824-8 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-289 (1950).
Some states have broadened the scope of the privilege by holding that acts are corn-
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testimonial privilege, there are variations phrased in terms of competency, 20 with a number of states adopting a waiver rule, 21 or giving
the privilege to the witness alone. 22
The communications privilege is generally supported on the theory
that knowledge by the spouses that their confidential communications
to each other will not be disclosed in court helps to foster an intimate,
harmonious relationship; that the possibility of future disclosures
"might cast a cloud upon an essential aspect of the institution of marriage"23 and cause greater injury to that institution than the benefit
24
which society would derive from the breach of a confidence at a trial.
However, critics of the communications privilege have observed that
there are so few persons outside the legal profession who are aware of
the privilege that it seems doubtful that knowledge that confidential
communications cannot later be disclosed in court has significantly
encouraged free and open communication between spouses. 25 Perhaps
a better explanation for the privilege is that it is a response to natural,
emotional feelings that prying into the intimacies of the marital relamunications. See, e.g., People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949) (wife's knowledge gained by observing her husband hiding stolen property in their home was the
result of a confidential communication; he would never have so conducted himself except
in reliance upon the privacy of the marital relationship); Menefee v. Commonwealth,
189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9 (1949) (divorced wife could not testify that she drove her husband to the place where a stolen safe had been buried and that she had seen him come
home with a revolver on the night of the crime); French v. Ware, 65 Vt. 338, 26 At.
1096 (1893) (dictum).
20 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (1956);
NEB. R v. STAT. § 25-1204 (Supp. 1964); N.H. R v. STAT. ANN. § 516:27 (1955).
21 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (Supp. 1965), Holloway v. Hoard, 140 Ga. 380,
78 S.E. 928 (1913); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.9 (1946), Crowell v. Northwestern Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 140 Ia. 258, 118 N.W. 412 (1908); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (1949), State v. Hill,
76 S.W.2d 1092 (Mo. 1934); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.11 (1966), Johnson v. State,
95 Tex. Crim. 483, 255 S.W. 416 (1923); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1958), State v.
Bell, 119 Vt. 306, 126 A.2d 121 (1956).
22 See, e.g., HAwAI Rxv. LAws § 222.19 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (1953); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-17-13 (1956), as interpreted by State v. Kenyon, 18 R.I. 217, 26 At.
199 (1893).
23 8 WimMOR, EVIDENCE § 2332, at 643 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See Comment, The
Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. RPv. 208, 231
(1961).
24 Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 113 (1956); see 8 WmoMRE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
25 Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, 19 CALIF. L. REV.
390, 413 (1931); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675, 682 (1929). But if the communications privilege were
now to be abolished, publicity about the change might reach large segments of the population of a state. One might then expect a decrease in communication between spouses
which could lead to marital disharmony.
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tionship is an act of indelicacy which a court ought not to commit. 2 6

It may, however, be a greater act of indelicacy to refuse to allow a wife
to offer exculpatory testimony and perhaps permit a conviction simply
27
to preserve the confidentiality of her husband's statements.
Of course the conflict between the wife's right to testify and her husband's exclusionary privileges cannot arise in those states which have
abolished the privileges entirely or which have given them to the witness alone. But in those states which retain either privilege in any of
the other forms described above, the conflict is a real possibility. How
serious the problem is may depend upon the circumstances of the individual case, since courts are likely to attempt to define narrowly the
28
scope of adversity or confidentiality.
The conflict between the wife's right to testify and her husband's
exclusionary privilege could be resolved in one of three ways. One
solution would be to eliminate the wife's right in cases of conflict. This
proposal can be rejected since it would seem improper either to be
concerned with marital harmony when the wife's life or freedom is
at stake, or to respect the intimacy of the husband's communication
to his wife when to do so would permit him to deprive her of an
opportunity to exculpate herself.
The second general approach would involve restricting the husband's privileges. Total abolition is, of course, too broad a solution to
be used simply to protect the wife in cases of conflict. A variation
would be to emulate those states which have given the testimony or
communications privilege to the witness spouse alone by adopting that
rule for both" privileges. Again, however, the solution seems to be
broader than the problem since the wife would be able to offer testimony at trials in which she were not a defendant and, therefore, would
have no pressing need to introduce evidence concerning her husband's
acts or communications. A more limited approach, like that followed
in Kentucky for confidential communications, 29 would be to abolish
26 MCCOMICK, EVIDENCE § 90 (1954); Comment,
27 MCCOMICK, EVIDENCE § 90 (1954).

supra note 23, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. at 212.

28 See, e.g., People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill. 2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955) (presence of third
person negated any inference that the communication was intended to be confidential;
statute makes no reference to third person).
29 See Gill v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). In that case a wife,
being jointly tried with another woman for armed robbery, objected to her husband's
testimony as to certain alleged confidential conversations which they had had regarding
the offense. The husband had previously been tried and convicted of the same crime
and was appearing as a witness for the prosecution. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that the confidential communications privilege did not cover conversations with
respect to criminal acts allegedly committed by a husband and wife. Although no interest
of the husband was protected by permitting him to testify, the court applied a limited
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the privileges whenever a husband and wife are jointly indictedwhether or not jointly tried-for a crime. However, this rule also seems
too broad since its effect is not to protect the wife in cases of conflict
but merely to tempt prosecutors to breach the confidence and harmony
of the marriage in order to secure a conviction.
What might be more desirable than these broad limitations upon the
husband's privileges would be a simple rule which would permit the
wife's right to testify to prevail over her husband's exclusionary privileges. This appears to be the result which will be obtained with regard
to confidential communications under section 987 of California's new
Evidence Code:
There is no privilege under this article in a criminal proceeding in which the communication is offered in evidence
by a defendant who is one of the spouses between whom the
communication was made.
This section is taken from the less precisely worded Uniform Rule of
Evidence 28(2)(d). The rule provides that neither spouse may claim
the communications privilege "in a criminal action in which the accused offers evidence of a communication between him and his
spouse." This apparently means that if an accused spouse offers testimony as to a confidential communication, neither he nor his codefendant spouse will be able thereafter to invoke the privilege as to that
communication. Rule 28(2)(d) is, however, susceptible to a broader
interpretation: an accused spouse has the option to dissolve the communications privilege entirely by offering evidence as to one communication between the spouses. Thereafter, the privilege would not apply
during the trial to any other, though unrelated, communication which
either might wish to keep secret. The rule would thus be similar to a
rule of total abolition of the communications privilege in joint or separate trials except that this rule would apply only if activated by an accused spouse. The latter interpretation of rule 28(2)(d) seems unjustifiably broad and was probably not the intention of the drafters. 30
California Evidence Code section 987 and Uniform Rule 28(2)(d) are
variations on Professor Wigmore's suggested exception to the comdissolution rule because it felt that the communications privilege should not protect the
spouses in their criminal endeavors. See Louisell, supra note 24, at 104. See also UNIFORM
RuL.E OF EVIDENCE 28(2)(e), discussed infra note 45.
30 Quick, Privileges under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U. GIN. L. REv. 537,
553 (1957). One other interpretation of rule 28(2)(d) is possible: in view of the use of
the definite article "the" in "the accused," it is quite possible that the rule only applies
when one of the spouses has been indicted. Compare CAL. EvID. CODE § 987 (effective
Jan. 1, 1967). If so, then only rule 28(2)(e) would be at all relevant, although it seems
to apply only when a conspiracy can be established by other evidence. See note 45 infra.
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munications privilege: 31 "[W]here an accused spouse needs the evidence of communications (by either spouse to the other), the privilege
32
should cease or a cruel injustice may be done."
Only a few states have adopted a rule of limited dissolution of the
husband's privileges. One state, Kansas, has adopted the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 3 which abolish the adverse testimony privilege, 34
but there are no reported cases applying rule 28(2)(d). California,
whose new evidence code goes into effect on January 1, 1967, has given
the adverse testimony privilege to the witness 35 and has provided the
exception noted above for confidential communications.3 6 Texas has
adopted a rule similar to the Wigmore suggestion with regard to confidential communications, although the adverse testimony restriction
remains.31 Again, there are no reported cases applying the rule. Finally,
Kentucky has adopted the broad rule discussed above which abolishes
the confidential communications privilege in cases of joint indictments.

38

Limited dissolution will solve the basic conflict without destroying
the whole marital privilege system. Furthermore, the theory that public policy may occasionally require limitations on privileges is at present accepted in most, if not all, states. Even states which make the wife
totally incompetent to testify against her husband have provided exceptions where he is charged with a crime against her person, or with
abandonment of a wife or child. 39 Similarly, exceptions to the various
restrictions on the disclosure of confidential communications have
been introduced to aid in the enforcement of the husband's legal obligations in cases of abandonment and non-support; 40 and in Mann
31 Wigmore's suggestion is apparently considered by some to be the direct ancestor

of rule 28(2)(a). See 8 WIGMoma, EvmENcE § 2338, at 666 n.3 (McNaughton rev. 1961);
MODEL CODE OF EvmFNcE rule 216, comment (1942), cited in UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
28, comment.
32 8 WIGMORE, EVmENcE § 2338, at 666 (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. TEx. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (1966).

33 RAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to 469 (1963). New Jersey has adopted a modified
version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence but without the exceptions in rule 28. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-22 (Supp. 1965).
34 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENC E 23.

35 CAL. Evm. CODE § 970 (effective Jan. 1, 1967).
36 The official comment to section 987 recognizes that the section introduces a new
concept into California evidence law.
37 See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (1966), and text accompanying note 4 supra.
38 See note 45 infra and text accompanying note 29 supra.
39 See N.C. GaN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1965); Tax. CODE CUiM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11
(1966).
40 See UNIFORM DESERTION AND NONSUPPORT Aar § 6 (23 states). See also UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT § 22 (1952) (32 states); UNIFORM RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACr § 25 (1958) (15 states).
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Act prosecutions, to keep the alleged offender from silencing his "victim" by marrying her, the defendant's wife can be compelled to testify
regardless of the effect upon her husband if in fact she was the woman
transported across state lines for purposes of prostitution. 41 Permitting
the wife to testify in order to exculpate herself would seem to be at
least as strong a justification for limiting her husband's exclusionary
privileges as any which could be advanced in favor of the present exceptions. But there are costs in implementing a rule of limited dissolution which detract from its desirability.
One defect common to all of the rules of limited dissolution is that
although the wife's ability to offer a reasonable defense will improve
if she is permitted fully to testify in her own behalf, the jury may have
an unfavorable reaction to a wife whose testimony seems designed to
exonerate herself at the expense of her husband who is on trial with
her.42 Even severance will not completely solve the problem, but it does
reduce its potential effect by permitting a jury to decide upon the
guilt of one person only; acceptance of the wife's defense by the jury at
her trial will not automatically mean conviction of the husband at his.
Another potential difficulty, which applies equally to giving control
over a privilege to the witness or to the accused, as in section 987 of the
California Evidence Code and rule 28(2)(d), or dissolving the privileges
outright in instances of joint indictments, is that such rules invite
abuse by overzealous prosecutors. If the prosecutor thinks the wife has
knowledge of her husband's activities, he may cause her to be indicted
with her husband regardless of whether he suspects her of complicity.
The intimacy of the marital relationship could easily produce the inference of complicity and the wife, fearing conviction for a crime she
did not commit, might offer testimony which would convict her husband. The mere fact that under these circumstances her testimony
might be voluntary would be no indication that her marriage was no
longer harmonious. It might only mean that the prosecutor had induced her to destroy her marriage in order to save herself. There is
also the danger that the wife might prefer to keep silent, in which case
she might be unjustly convicted as a result of her loyalty to her husband.
A serious defect in emulating Professor Wigmore's suggested exception to the communications privilege is that it may be extremely diffi41 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1959).
42 Such a situation was thought likely to occur in reverse in State v. Pickles, 46 N.J.
542, 218 A.2d 609 (1966), where the court thought that the jury might react unfavorably
to the husband's attempt to cast blame upon his wife for the death of their son through
neglect of the child's bums; severance was granted.

1966]

Marital Privileges

cult for a trial judge to make a prospective determination of "need"that is, the importance of the wife's testimony to her defense. 43 For
example, if the wife, in the course of attempting to establish that she
did not participate in a robbery, declares that her codefendant spouse
told her that he had just held up a store, the judge will not only have
to determine the relevance of the remark to her defense but also, assuming relevancy, the probability that exclusion of the statement will
prevent her from offering to the jury a credible defense. Whichever
party is adversely affected by his ruling will, if convicted, raise the
issue on appeal and in close decisions the chances for reversal and
retrial are likely to be quite high. Furthermore, for the rule to be administered properly the trial judge would have to hear the testimony
to be offered by the wife outside the presence of the jury to be certain
that they did not hear statements by the wife which were not essential
to her defense but which would be damaging to her husband.4 4 In
instances where the wife is seeking to establish a defense which conflicts with that of her husband, such as coercion, her husband's defense
counsel may be forced to raise numerous objections to her testimony
each of which would require the judge to leave the courtroom or excuse the jury so that he might hear her testimony and evaluate its
probable impact in relation to her total defense. The result would
be both time consuming and disruptive. Furthermore, the jury might
become suspicious of the interruptions and begin to draw inferences
adverse to the husband; or the husband's attorney, fearing such inferences, might feel constrained to avoid making some objections which
he ought properly to make.
The strength of the California Evidence Code and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence is that they do not pose a similar evaluative problem: the wife's testimony as to her husband's confidential communications is limited only by the general requirements of relevance which
are imposed upon the testimony of any witness. Yet this strength is
also a weakness. Since the trial judge has little or no discretion to exclude the wife's testimony, he must allow the wife to testify even when
her evidence will have little effect upon her own fate. For example, if
43 Cf. TEx. CoDE Cussf. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (1966), apparently requiring the trial
judge to determine whether the content of the communication to be revealed will
"extenuate or justify the offense."
44 For example, if the wife, in attempting to prove that she had not aided her husband in the commission of an armed robbery by driving the getaway car, testifies that
on the day following the robbery her husband had told her that he had solved their
money problems the previous day, the effect would undoubtedly be to incriminate the
husband in the eyes of the jury despite the questionable relevance of the statement to
the wife's defense and despite instructions by the court to disregard it.
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the state has produced little or no evidence to sustain a conviction or
the wite or it the other evidence against her is absolutely conclusive of
her guilt, testimony as to details of the crime, which her husband allegedly revealed to her, would not aid her but would only serve to
convict her husband. The Kentucky rule would seem to be subject to
the same criticism. 45 It suffers from the further defect that the rule applies even when the spouses are being tried separately although the wife
has no need to offer the testimony at her husband's trial. Clearly these
rules, which permit the wife to reveal confidential communications
without regard to the importance of the testimony to her own defense,
are at odds with the law's normal reluctance to pry into the confidentiality of a marriage except for strong reasons.
The third general approach would be for the trial judge to grant
severance either automatically on the motion of either accused spouse
or, as is now done, whenever it appears that at a joint trial the wife's
right to testify would conflict with her husband's exclusionary privileges. Severance is clearly the practical alternative to limited dissolution of the husband's privileges, but its use is not barred in those states
which now permit limited dissolution.
The attractiveness of severance stems at least in part from the fact
that it avoids the conflict between the wife's right to testify and her
husband's exclusionary privileges by eliminating the situation in which
it arises-the joint trial. Furthermore, the trial judge's task in deciding
whether there would actually be a conflict at a joint trial sufficient to
require severance is eased considerably by the knowledge that in a
45 See Gill v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964), discussed supra
note 29.
Uniform Rule of Evidence 28(2)(e) escapes this criticism at the cost of posing another
evaluative problem. The rule states that neither husband nor wife can claim the communications privilege "if the judge finds that sufflcient evidence, aside from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a finding that the communication was
made, in whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone to plan to commit a crime or a
tort." This seems to contemplate a conspiracy or concerted action and may be of no
help at all to an innocent wife; the mere fact that the disclosure of a communication
exculpates her may negate the validity of the finding that the communication aided
the commission of a crime. See CAL. Ev. CODE § 981 & comment. In any event, the trial
judge's determination that there was or was not "sufficient evidence, aside from the communication" could prove to be a continual source of appeals.
Two old Texas cases, which are probably superseded by TEx. CoDE CRim. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.11 (1966), have been cited as standing for the proposition that "when husband and
wife are coconspirators, or when the evidence justifies such a conclusion, a declaration
of the husband or wife at the time of the act is not privileged." 97 C.J.S., Witnesses § 269,
at 773, citing Goforth v. State, 100 Tex. Crim. 442, 273 S.W. 845 (1920), and Thompson
v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 417, 178 S.W. 1192 (1915). However, in both cases the communications were made in the presence of third parties who testified as to their contents. The
proposition has not been cited as authority for a decision after Goforth, but recently, in
Gill v. Commonwealth, supra at 851, the Kentucky Court of Appeals cited it as authority
for the rule of limited dissolution laid down in that case.
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close case granting a motion for severance is not likely to be charged
as error by either defendant. Any risk to the marriage posed by the
wife's testimony is substantially reduced because testimony given by
her at her own trial could clearly be excluded by her husband at his
trial if covered by his exclusionary privileges 46 and could thus have
no direct effect upon his fate.4 7 This same reason reduces the incentive
for the prosecutor to press a spurious indictment of the wife since she
could avoid testifying adversely to her husband by obtaining a separate trial. Finally, as noted above, severance reduces the possibility
that the jury might react unfavorably to what might appear to be an
attempt by one spouse to get the jury to convict only the other.
One difficulty with severance as a solution is that, as administered
today, its granting is purely discretionary and is usually said to be available only upon a prospective determination by the trial judge that
there is a high probability that one of the codefendants at a joint trial
will be prejudiced by the defense offered by the other.48 Severance is
therefore not available as a matter of right,49 and a decision denying
severance will not be reversed unless the trial judge has clearly abused
his discretion8 0 What apparently lies behind the restricted application
of severance is a recognition that, especially in conspiracy cases
where it is desirable to have all of the defendants together before a
jury, separate trials are more difficult to prosecute, and are more expensive and time consuming than a joint trial.51 Thus, severance is likely
46 State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 553 (1960).
47 If the husband is tried first, then there is no danger whatever that he could be

harmed by any information his wife might divulge. See Ayres v. State, 105 Tex. Crim.
15, 284 S.W. 960 (1926).
48 See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965). But see State v. Cotton,
218 N.C. 577, 12 S.E.2d 246 (1940). Some courts state that the trial judge has an obligation throughout a trial to grant severance whenever it appears that one defendant has
been prejudiced by joinder with a codefendant. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 549 F.2d
720 (2d Cir. 1965); State v. Nutley, 24 Wisc. 2d 527, 129 N.V.2d 155 (1964). It is possible
that most appellate courts would reverse a denial of a motion for severance based upon
a reasonable prospective evaluation of the evidence to be presented if it turned out that
one defendant had been severely prejudiced by joinder with his codefendants. See, e.g.,
State v. Pickles, 46 N.J. 542, 218 A.2d 609 (1966). But pronouncements in cases like
Hunt would indicate that for many courts the prejudice must be shown to have been
quite severe.
49 But see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6197 (1961). This statute is interpreted to entitle a
defendant to a separate trial if he so elects. State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 146 W. Va.
549, 120 S.E.2d 260 (1961).
50 See Opper v. United States, 548 U.S. 84 (1954); Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1965); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 551 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955); State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965).
See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 850 (1957), for scores of cases from many jurisdictions adhering to this rule.
51 United States v. Andreadis, 258 F. Supp. 800 (D.C.N.Y. 1965). But see State v.
Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 554 P.2d 555 (1960) (McGhee, C.J.); People v. Krugman, 44
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to be granted only when the defense of one accused person will be
52
clearly prejudiced by joinder with his codefendants at a single trial.
Yet if severance is to be an effective solution here, it ought to be available automatically upon the motion of either accused spouse. The
judge's instructions to the jury to disregard those portions of a wife's
testimony which are prejudicial to her husband are inadequate since
they will not wash the memory of her words from the minds of the
jury.5 3 An automatic severance rule would also avoid the necessity for
the trial judge to decide if either the wife's right to testify or the
husband's exclusionary privileges might be denied at a joint trial; a
conspicuous ground for reversal on appeal would thus be eliminated.
For example, in cases in which the wife seeks to establish a defense of
nonparticipation in her husband's crimes, much of her testimony will
probably clash with her husband's exclusionary privileges. But it may
not be possible to determine prospectively the extent of the conflict or
the effect of individual rulings by the judge; in retrospect it may turn
out that every ruling concerning the admission or exclusion of testimony aided one defendant only at the expense of prejudice to the
other. Finally, an automatic severance rule would introduce a con54
sistency which has long been lacking in the case law on severance.
One shortcoming in the use of severance is that it is not entirely clear
that the husband could not object to his wife's attempts to reveal confidential communications at her separate trial. If the primary purpose
of the communications privilege is the maintenance of marital privacy,
then it might follow that a husband could exclude his wife's testimony
even though he is not a party to her trial. 5 Such a result should not be
Misc. 2d 48, 252 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (Sobell, J.). Both Judge McGhee and Judge
Sobell condemn the practice of refusing to grant severance solely on the grounds of the
speed, economy, or convenience of a single trial. See also Comment, Exercise of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon
the Accused, 33 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 151, 161 (1965).
52 See, e.g., People v. Aranda, 63 C.2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965); State
v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960); People v. Krugman, 44 Misc. 2d 48, 252
N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
53 Accord, State v. Green, 46 N.J. 192, 215 A.2d 546 (1965); Smith v. State, 141 Tex.
Crim. 577, 150 S.W.2d 388 (1941).
54 Compare People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927), with People v. Feolo,
282 N.Y. 276, 26 N.E.2d 256 (1940). Although neither case involved codefendant spouses,
the cases provide a striking example of the inconsistencies in the application of severance
to very similar fact situations.
55 Cf. Commonwealth v. Cleary, 152 Mass. 491, 25 N.E. 834 (1890); see People v.
Ernst, 506 Ill. 452, 138 N.E. 116 (1943) (defendant charged with forgery not permitted
to testify to wife's statements authorizing him to sign her name); People v. Bowen, 165
Mich. 231, 130 N.W. 706 (1911) (husband charged with murdering his wife not allowed
to testify as to her confession of infidelity to him); Steeley v. State, 17 Okla. Crim. 232, 187
Pac. 321 (1920) (husband charged with killing another man not permitted to testify as
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permitted. The husband's privilege should be dissolved at the wife's
separate trial so that she may offer exculpatory testimony. Even if the
privilege were to be limited only in cases where the husband has
already been tried, and thus could not be harmed by his wife's disclosures,'1 severance still retains its advantages with regard to adverse
spousal testimony. Furthermore, in those states which have given the
communications privilege to the witness or have adopted a rule of limited dissolution there is certainly no barrier to granting severance and
thus no barrier to a wife who wishes to offer testimony at her own trial
as to her husband's confidential communications.
An instructive instance of the use of severance to avoid the husband-wife conflict is found in State v. Turnbow.57 Turnbow, his wife
Rita, and one Carter were jointly indicted for the murder of a storekeeper during an attempted robbery. At trial, the Turnbows moved
for severance on the grounds of mutually antagonistic defenses and
conflict between the right of the spouses as defendants to testify and
the incompetence of a spouse to render testimony adverse to his mate.
Severance was denied. Over Rita Turnbow's objection, extra-judicial
statements of James Turnbow were admitted which tended to incriminate his wife. Rita, in attempting to establish the defense of
coercion by her husband, testified over his objection to prior instances
where he had committed acts of violence against her. The trial judge
apparently felt that prejudicial error could be avoided by special instructions to the jury to disregard the evidence of each spouse which
was adverse to the other. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held
that the denial of the motion for severance and the use instead of special instructions to the jury constituted reversible error on the facts
of this case. The court pointed out that here was a clear case of conflict
between a spouse's right to testify in his own behalfPs and the right of
the codefendant spouse to exclude that testimony if incriminatory 9a conflict which could only be resolved by separate trials:
to statements made by his wife admitting infidelity in order to prove his state of mind);
Tingley v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 639, 184 Pac. 599 (1919) (same). In each of these cases,
the defendant's wife was not on trial nor even charged with an offense. It is difficult to
see what interest was being protected, especially in People v. Bowen, supra, where the
wife was dead. AWigmore cites these cases as examples of instances where the communications privilege should be dissolved so that the accused spouse may present evidence which
he may desperately need. See 8 WIGMORE, Ev DENCE § 2338, at 666 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
50 Cf. Ayres v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 15, 284 S.V. 960 (1926).
57 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960).
58 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-19 (1953).
59 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-12 (Supp. 1964). Curiously, the language of the statute is
framed in terms of the incompetency of a spouse to testify, but the court spoke of a
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No reason was given by the lower court for its action in denying severance, but if the decision was based on any concern
for expediency or convenience of prosecution, these matters
are subservient to the important inquiry: Whether a separate
trial will assist or impede the proper administration of justice
and secure to the accused the rights of a fair trial.60
On balance, severance seems to be the best solution. Unlike any of
the rules of limited dissolution of the husband's privileges, severance
poses no threat that an innocent wife might be indicted with her suspected criminal husband merely for the sake of prosecutorial convenience. Unlike the Wigmore approach, severance poses no serious
problem to the trial judge in that if the judge, in close cases, opts for
severance, his decision is unlikely to be reversed. Furthermore, the
added costs of separate trials are unlikely to be higher than the costs
of new trials which would result from the practical difficulty of the trial
judge's deciding whether a Wigmore-type rule should apply. If severance, like the rules of limited dissolution, is permitted to operate so
as to allow the disclosure of confidential communications between the
spouses which might better be kept secret, such testimony would still
be less threatening to the stability and harmony of a marriage at a separate trial than at a joint trial because the testimony would be likely to
have no direct effect upon the husband's fate.
Thus, severance seems preferable to the use alone of any of the available rules of limited dissolution of the husband's exclusionary privileges. It is also preferable to the use of curative instructions in
states retaining either or both of the husband's privileges; in those
states severance should be granted automatically upon the motion of
either codefendant spouse. Denial of the husband's exclusionary privileges would probably constitute prejudicial error. 61 But the granting of
either privilege would result in a denial of the wife's right to speak in
her own behalf and would also be grounds for reversal on appeal.
Severance therefore leaves undisturbed the interests protected by the
privileges, removes conspicuous grounds for reversal on appeal, and
provides a full and fair hearing to both husband and wife.
right to exclude testimony, citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), which
spoke of a privilege. This is a typical example of the blurring of the various formulations regarding marital testimony restrictions which tends to confuse the whole area.

60 67 N.M. 241, 247, 354 P.2d 533, 538 (1960).
61 But see People v. Bartell, 386 Ill. 483, 54 N.E.2d 700 (1944), where the other evidence was so conclusive against the defendant that the admission of testimony by his
wife as to a confidential communication to her was held harmless error.

